The Real Distinction Argument
Descartes formulates this argument in many different ways, which has led many scholars to believe there are several different real distinction arguments. However, it is more accurate to consider these formulations as different versions of one and the same argument. The fundamental premise of each is identical: each has the fundamental premise that the natures of mind and body are completely different from one another.
The first version:
I have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a thinking, non-extended thing.
I have a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended, non-thinking thing.
Therefore, the mind is really distinct from the body and can exist without it.
The second version: This argument can be reformulated as follows, replacing “mind” for “I” as in the first version:
I understand the mind to be indivisible by its very nature.
I understand body to be divisible by its very nature.
Therefore, the mind is completely different from the body.
The consequences of this problem are very serious for Descartes, because it undermines his claim to have a clear and distinct understanding of the mind without the body. For humans do have sensations and voluntarily move some of their bodily limbs and, if Gassendi and Elizabeth are correct, this requires a surface and contact. Since the mind must have a surface and a capacity for motion, the mind must also be extended and, therefore, mind and body are not completely different. This means the “clear and distinct” ideas of mind and body, as mutually exclusive natures, must be false in order for mind-body causal interaction to occur. Hence, Descartes has not adequately established that mind and body are two really distinct substances.
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